Indonesia to keep shining

By Robert M Cutler/Asia Times /August 27,2010.
MONTREAL - Jakarta's principal stock market index has more than doubled since President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono won the July 2009 presidential elections with a margin that made a run-off unnecessary.

Yudhoyono's comfortable victory came three months after his Democratic Party coalition won 314 of the 560 seats up for election to the People's Representative Council, the country's legislature. The stage was set for a period of political stability that has encouraged investment by local and overseas companies, including South Korean steel giant POSCO, and consumer spending.

The economy in the second quarter grew 6.2% compared with a year earlier and expanded at a rate 2.8% faster than in the previous three months, according to the country's Central Bureau of Statistics. Yudhoyono has set a 6.6% goal for annual economic growth, and the consensus is that this will probably reach at least 6.0%.

Exports, capital investment, and the consumer sector all contributed to the advance. Domestic consumption, though, was the main driver, accounting for over two-thirds of the country's growth, an atypically high figure for the region. Domestic automobile and motorcycle sales are a backbone of the consumer spending statistic, and gains there translate into Stock market strength - local automaker Astra International accounts for no less than 8% of the capitalization-weighted Jakarta Stock Exchange Composite Index (JCI).

The Indonesian stock market has been one of Asia's stand-outs, with the JCI powering up from 1,111 last October to 3,141 as of Wednesday's close. This growth is equivalent to a compounded rise of almost 4.84% per month consistently for nearly two years. The performance includes a recovery from 2,614 near the end of May to the present level, itself equivalent to a 1.42% compounded weekly increase over the last three months.
The JCI surpassed its previous (mid-January 2008) all-time high of 2,810 in early April this year, then fell back, passed it again in early June and has not looked back since. It has been showing short-term strength for the last two-and-a-half weeks, and this is continuing. That previous all-time high came from the basis of a level at 361 in mid-October 2002, itself a record of over five years of consistent growth of 3.37% compounded monthly.

The JCI has significantly outperformed the country’s other major market index, the LQ45, which is (as Bloomberg News explains) "a capitalization-weighted index of the 45 most heavily traded stocks on the Jakarta Stock Exchange", whereas the JCI is "a modified capitalization-weighted index of all stocks listed on the regular board of the Indonesia Stock Exchange". For example, over the past five years, the JCI has vaulted 216%, but the LQ45 is up "only" 174% during the same period.

Jakarta's stock market capitalization remains relatively small, given the size of the country. The market cap is only one-third of Taiwan's even though Indonesia's population is 10 times as large. At the same time, the country has well-established regional and global political links through membership of organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Group of 20.

Like many Asian economies, Indonesia's is less financially intermediated by the international banking institutions that find themselves under continuing, if no longer immediate, threat. Its investment regulations are still seen as unfriendly in comparison with many Asian peers, and administrative steps have been under way for some time to improve the climate for foreign capital. Endemic red tape, corruption, and poor infrastructure complicate attempts to realize the potential of the country’s natural resource base.

HSBC economist Wellian Wiranto nevertheless remarked this month that "[F]oreign direct investment may be contributing more and more to growth, judging from the gathering interest among international companies seeing Indonesia as a big market with a large pool of labor force, right where the raw materials are", as quoted by India's Economic Times. POSCO, South Korea’s largest steelmaker, is only one of the latest to sign an agreement with an Indonesian firm for a new industrial plant (a steel mill in West Java with Krakatau Steel).

Relatively low interest rates are spurring consumption, although with annual inflation reaching a 15-month high of 6.22% in July, up from 5.05% a month earlier, those rates may be increased. Still, companies are plowing profits back into investment.

The only cause for worry would be the increasing unemployment rate, although even this has not worsened as much as feared. About half of the country's total employment remains in the agricultural sector, although it is not clear what proportion of those formally counted in agriculture may migrate seasonally to the cities. The high degree of informal-sector employment is a worry to economists and reformers, but it does provide a cushion of sorts.

At the same time, the country's export structure has the advantage of being more oriented toward Asian economies and therefore less dependent upon the vagaries of the Western consumer resilience. That does not make it immune from following global markets in the wake of periodic financial-crisis downturns, but these tend to be transitory waves of market emotion and not based on fundamental economic realities.

For these and other reasons, it is foreseeable that the Jakarta stock market will continue its stellar performance, other things being equal, even if it suffers the occasional inevitable hiccup. In the short term, for example, it is looking a bit overbought, even if volume has lately been impressive and a number of short-term technical indicators remain favorable. It is attempting to confirm its surmounting of a long-term ascending-tops trend line while it is at the same time at the top of a medium-term ascending-tops trend line.

Dr Robert M Cutler (http://www.robertcutler.org), educated at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and The University of Michigan, has researched and taught at universities in the United States, Canada, France, Switzerland, and Russia. Now senior research fellow in the Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, Carleton University, Canada, he also consults privately in a variety of fields.

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Time for China to spend more

by Makmur Keliat, Jakarta | Sun, 08/22/2010 12:29 PM | Opinion The Jakarta Post

In some way, diplomacy could be analogous to someone who wants to travel from one place to another. In order to reach their destination at the right time and to make the journey comfortable, it is necessary to have a road map. This metaphor may be useful to get a broader picture of the diplomatic road that has been built by China in its relationship with Indonesia and ASEAN.

The first attempt to build a road from Beijing to Jakarta was made on April 13, 1950. But it was closed on Oct. 30, 1967 when the New Order regime decided not to continue its diplomatic relations with Beijing. That decision resulted in substantial change in the Sino-Indonesian relationship.

The two countries did not have official diplomatic relations for almost 23 years. The diplomatic road between Beijing and Jakarta was only rebuilt on Aug. 8, 1990. The Indonesian business community at that time had made strong efforts to encourage the Indonesian government to be closer to China. The interruption has shown us that the diplomatic road built by Beijing to reach Jakarta was not made overnight.
Three interesting developments can be identified now the diplomatic road between Beijing and Jakarta has entered the second phase, more than two decades on.
First, China has effectively utilized the road between Beijing and Jakarta to establish a number of intersections through which the country has become well connected and has wider access to other countries and diplomatic forums in Southeast Asia. China has been engaged in the ASEAN+1 and ASEAN+3 mechanisms and is also a member of the East Asia Summit.
It seems the diplomatic road to Jakarta has become an entry point for China to proliferate its diplomatic network and channels to the Southeast Asian region.
Second, China has succeeded in utilizing the Beijing to Jakarta diplomatic road to change attitudes with regard to the communist ideological threat of the 1960s era. Most people in Indonesia no longer see China as a poor country and the bastion of the communist ideological camp, despite the fact that China politically is still ruled by a communist regime. Thanks to media reports, China currently is seen more as a country with the largest reserve of foreign exchange in the world.
Third, China has primarily utilized the entire diplomatic intersection to cope with its large need for energy and natural resources and to speed up regional measures for trade and investment liberalization with ASEAN.
Let us take an example from the case of the ASEAN+1 mechanism. Under the umbrella of the ASEAN+1 mechanism, China in the year 1992 succeeded in persuading ASEAN to agree with the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between ASEAN and the People’s Republic of China.

In fact, the idea of a ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) cannot be separated from, and is an integral part of, policy packages of the Framework Agreement. It is worth mentioning that the first stage of the ACFTA has been introduced without getting widespread public notice in Indonesia.
This can also be considered a diplomatic achievement of China. Formulated as an early harvest program, the target of the first stage has been the reduction of tariff rates for agricultural products to zero percent by the year 2006. That is why, since 2004, Indonesia has received a flood of various agricultural products from China.
In this regard, it would be too much to expect that Indonesia would be able to renegotiate the implementation the ACFTA. China is fully aware that Indonesia is in great need of funding resources from outside for the development of infrastructure.
By utilizing numerous diplomatic intersections it has built with the region, it is more likely that China will do its best to convince Jakarta that the more open the diplomatic road between Jakarta and Beijing, the larger the opportunity for Indonesia to get funding resources from China for building power plants, bridges and roads.
A more realistic option for Indonesia would be to persuade China to accelerate noneconomic cooperation, with the objective that it could be carried out as fast as implementation in the economic field.
The starting point to realize the option is through taking measures to concretize the general points of agreement embodied in the document of strategic partnership signed in 2005.
It is interesting to note the document has not been fully implemented, particularly items related to cooperation in the noneconomic field. China seems to have built a road for economic cooperation with Indonesia like building a highway, but cooperation in a number of other fields such as culture, education and defense seems to have appeared merely as a road map without any real journey being undertaken.
Therefore, the most challenging task that lies ahead in the Sino-Indonesian relationship in the years to come will be how to transform the document of strategic partnership into reality.
Jakarta should do its utmost to convince Beijing that if the focus of cooperation is directed solely on economic aspects, there will be little possibility for China to enlarge its constituency in Indonesia, which could be expected to lend support to the enhancement of Sino-Indonesian relations.
The constituency so far has mainly come from, and been limited to, the business community in this country. China should not repeat the bitter experience of Japan, which was regarded in Indonesia as an economic animal in the early 1970s.
In this regard, enlarging the scope for philanthropic activities, for instance through giving more scholarships to the academic community, might be useful to broaden the constituency. However, this is only possible if China accepts the idea that it is time for the country to spend more and earn less in its bilateral relationship with Indonesia.
The writer is chairperson of the Postgraduate Program, Department of International Relations, School of Social and Political Sciences, the University of Indonesia.

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Indonesia, the region and the world

Author: Dewi Fortuna Anwar, Kyoto University
The visit by United States President Barack Obama to Indonesia later in 2010 will undoubtedly put Indonesia in the limelight. Obama’s visit is seen by many as recognition of Indonesia’s international standing as the largest country in Southeast Asia, the largest Muslim majority nation, the world’s third largest democracy, and one of the world’s 20 largest economies. Much was also made of Hillary Clinton’s visit, which made Indonesia the second country that she visited after being appointed as the US Secretary of State in early 2009. Recently, a number of Indonesian and foreign observers have noted Indonesia’s return to regional and international activism after a period of crippling domestic crises.

It is sometimes said that Indonesia is the most important country that the world knows least about. For the most part this is due to the style of foreign policy implemented throughout Suharto’s more than 30 year rule. In response to President Sukarno’s ‘lighthouse’ foreign policy in which Indonesia strutted as the global spokesman for newly independent nations, and confronted the western colonialist-imperialist powers, Suharto pursued the opposite course. Indonesian foreign policy under Suharto was deliberately low profile, narrowly focused on peace and stability in Southeast Asia, and designed to bring direct economic benefits to Indonesia though trade and investment. While mostly successful in its immediate development objectives, Indonesia lost its profile in the international arena, even though it was still recognised as first among equals within ASEAN.
Indonesia, supported by the major western powers during the Cold War as a staunch anti-communist bulwark, was mostly known to the wider international community for its holiday resorts in Bali, and for its military occupation of East Timor. The end of Suharto’s rule was followed by incessant news of riots, communal conflicts, regional insurgencies, religious extremism and terrorist bomb attacks. For many people not familiar with the country these events summed up Indonesia: an unfamiliar and dangerous place.
Today a successful democracy has replaced Suharto’s authoritarian regime. The economy is recovering from the global crisis, and Indonesia’s status as the world’s largest Muslim majority nation with a predominantly moderate brand of Islam has suddenly become an asset. The international community, and especially the West, now has a higher expectation of the country. In a global climate marred by Islamic religious extremism and threats of terrorism, Indonesia, with its claim as a country in which Islam, democracy and modernity go hand-in-hand, is seen as a credible force of moderation.
Within ASEAN, Indonesia’s resurgence has been welcomed with both anticipation and unease. A revitalised Indonesia clearly helps to reinvigorate ASEAN, but an Indonesia that is strident about democracy and human rights is very different from the familiar champion of the ‘ASEAN Way’ which upheld the principle of strict non-interference in each country’s internal affairs. Indonesia has also been basking in international attention, exemplified by the forthcoming visit of President Barack Obama and invitations to participate in various prestigious forums, such as the 2007 Annapolis conference on Palestine and, most important of all, membership in the new grouping of the world economic powerhouses, the G20. Indonesia is currently the only Southeast Asian member of the G20.
Now calls have become much louder for Indonesia to once again walk tall on the world stage, to play a role as a peace-broker in various international conflicts, to act as an interlocutor in the dialogue between the Muslim world and the West, to be a spokesman for developing countries in the G20, and to drive ASEAN to respect democracy and human rights.
At the same time, Suharto’s legacy of a more narrowly focused foreign policy aimed at obtaining concrete outcomes for Indonesia’s economic development, given that Indonesia is still a relatively poor country, is equally influential. many have argued that Indonesia’s first priority must be to improve the livelihoods of the people and its foreign policy must, first and foremost, be aimed at achieving economic benefits for Indonesia. It is also argued that Indonesia should get its house in order first, including improving its own democracy and governance, before it tries to promote democracy and human rights elsewhere.
The push and pull between a Sukarno-style ‘lighthouse’ international stance and a more pragmatic, economically-focused effort will likely mark the course of Indonesia’s foreign policy in the years ahead. Which trend will prevail is likely to be determined by the dynamics of internal politics as competing actors seek to influence formulation and implementation of a foreign policy which can no longer be decided behind closed doors.
Dewi Fortuna Anwar is a Research Fellow at the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Kyoto University, and was previously Assistant to the Vice President for Global Affairs and Assistant Minister/State Secretary for Foreign Affairs in the Indonesian government.

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U.S.-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership: Will It Work?

Fabio Scarpello | Bio | 27 Jan 2010
World Politics Review
DENPASAR, Indonesia -- Under the leadership of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, U.S.-Indonesia ties have progressively strengthened since he first took office in 2004. Yudhoyono earned a masters degree in the U.S. and has never hidden his liking for the States. So it came as no surprise when, in November 2008, the former general-turned-president called for a U.S.-Indonesia strategic partnership, later renamed a comprehensive partnership.

The move was in turn welcomed by U.S. President Barack Obama, who himself is sentimentally attached to the archipelagic nation where he spent a part of his childhood. Soon after Obama's inauguration, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated the administration's commitment to work toward such a partnership, guided by a concrete agenda.

While the two leaders share a mutual fondness for each other's country, the partnership itself is based on rational foreign policy objectives, and is designed to frame U.S.-Indonesia bilateral relations for the next decade. As such, it is meant to cover issues of importance to both nations -- including educational exchanges, trade and investment cooperation, climate change policy, food security and non-traditional security issues, such as the fight against terrorism, trans-national drug syndicates and people smuggling, among others.

For Indonesia, the partnership is part of a broader initiative that has seen the country inking similar agreements with the major regional powers -- China, India, South Korea and Japan -- as well as with the European Union. It is also an attempt to move the bilateral agenda beyond the limited security issues that dominated Jakarta-Washington relations during the Bush administration.

For the U.S., on the other hand, closer ties with Indonesia, the world's largest majority-Muslim country and a key player in Southeast Asia, fit perfectly with Obama's outstretched hand towards the Islamic world as well as his administration's attempt to regain some of the terrain the U.S. has lost to China in the region over the last few years.

Southeast Asia figures prominently in some of Washington's global preoccupations, including transnational crime, energy and food security, and climate change. It is therefore likely that Washington also sees the partnership with Indonesia as a means to channel its concerns, and desired solutions, for the region.

However, although the rationale to seal the deal is strong and the partnership is expected to be inked when Obama travels to Indonesia sometime during 2010, questions remain about whether it will have any real effect on the ground.

A key problem is Indonesia's capacity to follow up on agreements, which was recently highlighted once more by the desire, among some in Jakarta, to reassess the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, on the basis that it could negatively impact the country's manufacturing sector.

The trade deal, which took effect on Jan. 1, will scrap import duties on thousands of Chinese products, a fact that has led Indonesian industry groups to call for parts of the deal to be renegotiated. The Ministry of Industry initially submitted a letter to the coordinating economic minister in late December 2009 to request that scheduled tariff reductions on 146 products be delayed by one year.

This weekend, Trade Minister Mari Elka Pangestu ultimately declared that Indonesia would not seek to postpone the deal's implementation. Still, the China-ASEAN deal was signed in 2005, after years of negotiations and Jakarta's preliminary studies have shown a lack of depth that should also serve as a warning signal for Washington.

Another question mark is the level of participation of the various Indonesian and American constituencies targeted by the agreement. Obama and Yudhoyono will sign the partnership, but for it to have an impact, it needs the support, supervision and enthusiasm of large segments of the two countries' civil societies and political establishments.

Currently, Indonesia remains off the radar for U.S. civil society, while the U.S. Congress remains wary, due to sensitive issues such as Indonesia's efforts to reform its abuse-tainted army, the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI).

In Indonesia, on the other hand, public opinion regarding the U.S. is split, with the Obama effect mitigating, but not eliminating, the reservations of those who see America as a neoliberal, imperialistic power. This segment of society, which partly coincides with radical Islamic groups, is very active and has a noticeable influence on the political discourse.

Some Indonesian lawmakers as well as senior members of the TNI also remain guarded about the U.S., who they accuse of being a volatile partner. The description refers mostly to Washington's decision to impose a ban on military-to-military relations after the TNI and its militias went on a rampage in the aftermath of East Timor's 1999 vote for independence.

Under the Bush administration, the U.S. lifted restrictions limiting military training and financing as well as weapons sales. But other restrictions remain, particularly regarding U.S. training of Kopassus, the notorious Indonesian special forces.

Moreover, while there seems to be a good chance of improving education-related exchanges -- currently at a historic low, according to the Unites States-Indonesia Society -- it is debatable whether the partnership will lead to any increase in bilateral trade and U.S. investment in Indonesia.

With regards to the latter, U.S. firms have traditionally been interested in Indonesia's natural resources, but that enthusiasm has lately been dampened by Jakarta's nationalistic approach. Despite Yudhoyono's commitment to an open economy, in fact, Indonesia remains cautious in matters of foreign ownership.

More broadly, U.S. investors have often been put off by Indonesia's high level of corruption, red tape and lack of infrastructure. The comprehensive partnership envisages U.S. support for Indonesia's drive towards good governance, but analysts agree that this is mostly an internal battle that must be fought by Jakarta, and which needs time to be won.

In the end, while most observers agree that the partnership is a step in the right direction, few are ready to celebrate it just yet.

Fabio Scarpello is the Southeast Asia correspondent for the Italian news agency Adnkronos International. He is based in Denpasar, Indonesia.

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How is Indonesia’s democracy doing?

Author: Larry Diamond, Stanford

Since the mid 1990s, the proportion of countries in the world that are democracies – countries that meet the standard of at least electoral democracies in the sense that they can choose their leaders and replace them in free and fair elections – has stagnated, at around 60 and 62.5 per cent.

The world is experiencing a democratic recession. There are three dimensions of this.

Firstly, there is levelling off of in the extent of democracy.

Secondly, there has been a rise in incidence of democratic breakdown in the world. Of the 29 democratic breakdowns since the third wave of democratization began in 1974, 17 (59 per cent) have occurred since 1999.

Thirdly many of these democratic breakdowns have happened in places that can be considered big, strategically important states, powers in their regions, and peers of Indonesia.

Indonesia is now labelled by Freedom House as a ‘free country’ – although this is a somewhat misleadingly broad category. Nevertheless, Indonesia is doing better today than any of the democracies that lost democracy were at the time they lost it.

A worrisome trend is the recent erosion not only of democracy but of levels of freedom. The last three years – 2006, 2007, 2008 – are the first three successive years since the end of the Cold War when the number of countries declining in a given year in their levels of freedom exceeded the number of countries improving their levels of freedom.

The fact that Indonesia is holding its own at a relatively good level of political rights and civil liberties is itself a noteworthy achievement.

While Indonesia’s civil liberties, political rights, and levels of governance have improved since 2005, it still has levels of governance, by a number of measures, which are in some respects in the category of vulnerability. The trend recently has been to suggest that Indonesia has either consolidated democracy or is very far along the path of doing so. There are grounds for being a little more sceptical.

Nevertheless, the level of public support for democracy in Indonesia compares favourably compared to other regions of the world. Globally there is a growing ambivalence toward democracy.

In East Asia and Africa only about half of respondents, in various surveys, on average rejected all of the 3 authoritarian options put to them: the military coming back to power; one party rule; and getting rid of parliament and having a strong ruler decide everything.
The cause of this is basically the reputation a government has in respect of bad governance.

So, how do Indonesia’s levels of governance and democracy fare in these comparisons?

A common story is that Indonesia began, at its moment of democratic transition in 1998, with pretty bad governance on most measures.

One measure of governance is economic performance. Indonesia’s average rate of GDP growth during the past decade has been respectable compared to a set of other significant emerging market democracies regionally and globally.

Indonesia’s Human Development Index (HDI) score, perhaps the most meaningful measure of economic development – incorporating standards of living, health, and education – improved almost 10 per cent between 1995 and 2006, reaching 73 per cent. This rate of improvement is greater than many of its peers, such as the Philippines and Thailand, and Indonesia has now almost caught up with the Philippines in terms of its HDI score.

A number of measures of governance used by the World Bank are also useful.

In 1998 Indonesia was in the bottom quintile in the world in terms of its level of voice and accountability. Only about 7 or 8 countries have improved their voice and accountability score as dramatically as Indonesia has. It now outranks several other countries, even Turkey surprisingly, and has overtaken the Philippines as well. But Indonesia is still out ranked by some more established democracies in East Asia.

In control of corruption Indonesia’s improvement in performance has been even more dramatic. But it started from an incredibly low level at the 9th percentile that it is still in the bottom third in the world. While Indonesia has now taken a higher position than the Philippines in terms of control of corruption too, it clearly needs to go further.

The rule of law in Indonesia has barely improved at all, and is still very weak. This is something we should worry about. And this is why we should exercise some caution in advancing a judgement that democracy in Indonesia is now consolidated. Even with respect to some not very well performing countries in the region, in terms of rule of law Indonesia finishes dead last among the democracies or quasi democracies in Asia.

Indonesia has of course improved it Freedom House score dramatically more than any of the countries in the sample. But again, it started from such a low level that it still has ground to catch up despite the improvements.

On the rule of law and political stability, things got worse between 1998 and 2003. Here you can really see the impact of the Yudhoyono presidency in terms of bringing about, or at least witnessing, significant improvements in the quality of governance.

An encouraging sign is how Indonesians view and value democracy relative to their peers in 5 other Asian countries. On a scale of 1 to 10 – with 10 being most democratic – survey participants were asked ‘to what extent they think their country is a democracy today?’ Indonesians gave an average score of 7 out of 10. Asked ‘to what extent do you want your country to be a democracy?’, Indonesians ranked very highly giving an average score of 8.5 out of 10.

Asked whether they supported democracy, 65 per cent of Indonesian said yes. And asked whether they were satisfied with the current democratic system 59 per cent answered yes.

Also, 56 per cent of Indonesians rejected authoritarianism. This is a reasonably healthy figure. If this was increased to 70 per cent, and was sustained for a prolonged period of time, we could more surely say that democracy has been consolidated. But it is premature to say it is already consolidated. Nevertheless, given the history and turbulence in Indonesia this is a surprisingly high score.

Support for liberal values is surprisingly high in Indonesia at 47 per cent. This vastly outstrips Thailand and the Philippines. Since this is usually highly correlated with education and economic development, and given limited years of experience with democracy, Indonesia is way ahead of where you would expect the country to be on the liberal values scale. They are much closer to Korea and Taiwan. And this is the single most telling indicator.

Looking in historical terms, and in comparative terms, what Indonesia has achieved in the last 10 years (in terms of the development and improvement of democratic institutions, a critical and substantial base of public support for democracy, of trust in public institutions, and, surprisingly perhaps, robust support for liberal values relative to elsewhere in the region) is quite remarkable and is deserving of admiration.

Yet democracy in Indonesia will not stand or fall on how well it is doing relative to other democracies in the world. It will stand or fall in terms of how well it is doing in itself.

It is worrying when somebody tries to set up a serious counter corruption institution and then it falters, never gets off the ground, and an audit commission never develops momentum, autonomy, vigour, and real capacity, because its just too threatening to vested interests in the system. This is the canary in the coal mine of democracies.

The conclusion that democracy in Indonesia is secure, for all time, not just for these few years, will be safe only when there has been more progress toward better governance than there has been so far.

Larry Diamond is Director of the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law at Stanford University, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Freeman Spogli Institute at Stanford, and author of ‘The Spirit of Democracy’.

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