It’s Time to Show Ambition (Why not Indonesia Run for UNSG Office)

By Perry PADA*

With the approaching end of 2006 discussions have begun to heat up over the issue of the next Secretary General of the U.N. Who would make the ‘ideal’ candidate? As a fixed yet informal rule of geographical rotation, this is the year for Asia. The U.S.A opposes this rotation tradition, and to date has not indicated its preference. Should the US not get its way, it is easily to predict that it will cast its support for a candidate from among its Asian friends or allies or at least from a country not ill disposed to US global policy. On the other hand, China is clearly insisting that the next Secretary General be an Asian.

Measuring the possibilities of an Asian candidate

There is an unwritten understandings among the big 5 countries or the permanent member of UNSC namely, USA, Russia, China, United Kingdom and France that there are some preconditions for a successful candidate: country profile and ability to stand firm in balancing and seeking a solution to the current global key issues such as globalization, terrorism, Weapons of Mass Destruction, social and global change, poverty eradication, global and human security, human trafficking, human rights and other key issues such as UN reform. Apart from those traditional preconditions, however, the most important precondition is obvious; ability to reflect issues as seen by members of the Security Council. In this sense, the clear support or blessing from USA is absolutely essential. Who are the potential UNSG candidates from Asia who can gain the recommendation of the Security Council to the General Assembly? Is Indonesia as the largest Asian country after India and China among the contenders? It does not seem to be. Why not is an interesting question?

To date there are only three Asian candidates: Thailand, South Korea and Sri Lanka. Other Asian countries, presumably, are playing a wait and see strategy while calculating the possible support from UNSC permanent members and the largest General Assembly groupings. The support for the three candidates remains fluid and may change at any time.

According to many sources within the UN diplomatic corps the above three Asian candidates have failed to garner clear support from the “Big 5” countries. These candidates apparently are distanced from the key global issues and the key countries. Among them the Deputy Prime Minister of Thailand claims to have the support of the nine ASEAN members, however, Thailand’s role within the global context is too limited. The reason is clear and simple, in the eyes of European and American countries; Thailand is not able to handle global issues given its insignificant contribution to those key issues. South Korea’s as well has a deficiency, as the Korean peninsula issue remains a big hurdle for the Korean candidate. It is unlikely that the Korean candidate will gain enough support from the European countries or China. The same comment can be made of the Sri Lankan candidate given its global profile and its alienation from the key issues at this point. If we assess the three candidates based on their global profile and their relations with the key countries, they do not display a strong and convincing prospect for success.

Other potential Asian candidates who are not yet in the running are India, Afghanistan and maybe Japan. Politically, India is not an attractive candidate owing to its protracted dispute with Pakistan. Afghanistan has very small chance owing to its unstable internal politics. Japan on the other hand is quite a strong Asian candidate, but China, for its own reasons, would likely oppose a Japanese candidature. In addition many Japanese currently hold high positions within the UN structure. Thus, given this brief analysis, Indonesia apparently is in a good position to make a successful run at becoming the next UNSG.

Why not Indonesia?

To the issue of an Indonesia candidate, Indonesia with the other 9 ASEAN member countries has already endorsed the Thai candidate as announced by the spokes- person of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs months ago(15/2/06) The support was offered as an act of ASEAN solidarity.

Regardless, Indonesia has the perfect profile for putting forward its own candidacy, should the Thai candidate falter. There are many good reasons why it could work politically. Examining the regional landscape, Indonesia’s geopolitical position by default is crucial to the stability of the region. Furthermore, the USA confronted with its present challenges needs to show that it is not anti Muslim; Indonesia is a perfect partner for the USA in addressing Muslim society and terrorism. The unfreezing of Indonesia-USA military cooperation and the current visit of the US Foreign Minister followed by US Defense Minister within the same month has shown the USA support for Indonesia’s international role and has paved the way for Indonesia to play a bigger role in the Middle East peace process. The visit of the British Prime Minister to many Muslim institutions in Indonesia is also a clear indication, that Indonesia remains an important actor within the global context of balancing religious Issues with temperance, which remains at the top of global agenda.

Indonesian relations with European Union countries are in excellent shape due to its involvement in the Aceh peace process as well as emergency Tsunami aid. The EU with many western countries donated more than 200 billion Euros to help solving the Aceh problem. Apart form EU, France and Germany individually will ago along with other key countries decision of the UNSG candidate as long as their interests are secured. For China, in addition to its traditional relationship with Indonesia, it does not have any objection as long as Indonesia supports its one-China policy. Indonesia never displays support for Taiwan independence. Further, the growing bilateral relationship between the two countries and particularly China’s large investments would be more secured and protected if it supported an Indonesian candidate. Russia would not be opposed as there is no hostility between the two. Actually bilateral relations between Indonesia and Russia are good due to recent military cooperation and military equipment procurement. Therefore, Indonesian relations with the 5 key countries on many key issues are quite positive at this moment.

Given the above sketch, it is clear that Indonesia has an excellent chance as a potential contender from Asia. Beside the above reasons, there are a long list of straight forward and logic reasons; First, Indonesia is a founding father of the non aligned movement, therefore it is neutral on many issues, secondly, as the largest Muslim country and the third largest democratic country in the world Indonesia obviously has leverage within both a regional and a global context, particularly when dealing with Muslim societies, thirdly, its geographical and demographic position has to be counted for regional security, fourthly, its relatively positive image due to its successful political transformation, from military authoritarianism to a Civilian regime is hailed by many western countries, and fifthly its success in arresting terrorists while empowering the moderates and sixthly, its good relations with key Middle East countries could permit her to play the role of mediator in the region for all interests, and finally the most important one its good relations with other group of 77 member countries who have come to dominate the General Assembly. Those all indeed are advantageous factors. The current Indonesian Foreign Minister , DR. Hassan Wirayuda or former Minister Ali Alatas are both experienced international figure who are outstanding candidates. Given its advantageous position, the question remains, why Indonesia has not put forward its own candidature?

The reason has not yet been made clear, as we have not seen any official statement, but what is clear is that there is some pessimism over the fact that we might not win. It can be assumed that Indonesia’s reluctance is due to its calculated balance sheet which has tilted to the negative. This conclusion to some measure may be due to internal problems namely, among others; firstly the separatist movement in Papua province, secondly, the residual problem on human rights in East Timor, and thirdly, the horizontal conflict in certain areas. Another reason which is very clear is that Indonesia apparently has been investing great effort into being elected to be a non permanent member of UN Security Council which is viewed as a more successful possibility. Given these two alternative positions {SGUN or non-permanent member of the SC}, at this point, it depends on Jakarta’s understanding of which option will more adequately serve the national interest.


Depok, 16 Juni 2006

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Islam and Democratization in Southeast Asia: Challenges and Opportunities

By. Dr. Hassan Wirajuda

First [- red] Indonesia is home to the world’s largest Muslim population—90 percent of a total of 220 million or some 198 million. It is a Muslim population that is by and large moderate. Most of the Muslims of Southeast Asia are, of course, moderate and there are moderate Muslims everywhere else. It just happens that international observers take a special view of this huge concentration of moderate Muslims in Indonesia. Perhaps it reassures them that the largest part of Islam is not a threat but a friend and contributor to civilization. At any rate, we are happy and proud that our country is considered the home of moderate Islam.

The second of the two dominant realities in our national life is the fact that Indonesia today is considered the world’s third largest democracy.It is important to note that following last year’s successful direct elections for president and vice president, the first in our history, local direct elections have started to take place for governors, regents and mayors this year.We are very much aware of the fact that democracy in Indonesia is still very much in need of further consolidation. We are further enhancing our political institutions and processes, amending laws and passing new ones in order to release the creative energies of our people and to make our system of governance more attractive to our foreign economic partners.

In sum, we have achieved a large measure of stability and we are poised for growth—socially, economically and politically. In this process of transition, Islam, as a moral force in support of reform, played a strong and positive role although it must also be said that there were times when Muslim militants and extremists loomed as part of the problem we were grappling with. This is not a new role for Islam. Muslim intellectuals and religious leaders have always participated in the political dynamics of Indonesia since our struggle for freedom and sovereignty. The debate about the relationship between Islam and the State already took place before we became an independent country, especially when our Founding Fathers drafted our constitution. However, when we finally won our independence in August 1945, our Founding Fathers reached a consensus that Indonesia should not be an Islamic state based on Shariah, and Islam should not become the religion of the state.But this is not the secularism that the West is well known for, in the sense of a constitutional separation between the state and religion. Instead, by constitutional mandate, the state has the obligation to promote the religious life of the people. Hence, the Ministry of Religious Affairs was established in the early years of the Republic.

The state treats the five recognised religions as on an equal footing with one another. One simple but important and unique feature of Indonesian life is the inclusion of the most important holidays of the recognized religions among our national public holidays. Human history has taught us that religious intolerance often comes from ignorance, either of our own religion or those of others. Here, another important feature of the Indonesian system is the inclusion of religious studies as a compulsory subject in our national education system. Early in their education process, our children are obliged to learn about their own religion as well as some basic knowledge about other religions. The idea is to build a tolerant, civilized and harmonious society.

On the ideological front, our Founding Fathers introduced Pancasila. It is an affirmation of Indonesia as a pluralist society, which accommodates diversities in religion, ethnicity, customs and traditions. As an ideology, it served as basis for the cultivation of the habit of consultation and consensus building as well as harmony among a widely diversified population. Pancasila helped in the building of a sense of national identity during the time of our first President, Sukarno. Under the “New Order” regime of our second President, Soeharto, this state ideology was elaborated and used in ways that were not anticipated by the Founding Fathers. Its connotation became so broad that it covered and justified just about every act of government. With Pancasila unchallengeable, advocacy on the adoption of Shariah was muted during the three decades of the New Order. The dynamics between Islamic organizations and the Government kept shifting on the basis of political developments and President Soeharto’s personal calculations.

In the 1980s and early 1990s, the New Order became more accommodating to the aspirations of Muslim organizations, including the institutionalization of political Islam through the establishment of the ICMI. With the fall of President Soeharto in the crisis of 1998, a new era of reform was launched and fresh democratic space was created for all—including Islamic politicians. Some 100 political parties, 40 of them with an Islamic character, blossomed during that period.

It is important to note, however, that there has also been a convergence between “Islamist” and “Nationalist” political orientations. On the one hand, a good number of significant Muslim leaders formed political parties with nationalist attributes and platforms—such as Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa and Partai Amanat Nasional. While, on the other hand, nationalist parties have embraced the influx of noted Muslim leaders, intellectuals, and activists. Thus, the classical dichotomy between Islamist and Nationalist is getting more and more blurred. This will help strengthening our national integration process. Political Islam by itself did not make any headway in the country’s transition to a more fully democratic system. In the 1999 general elections, all the 40 Islamic parties could get no more than 17.8 percent of the votes cast. Subsequently, the proposal for the adoption of the Shariah, initially planned to be tabled by two parties, was graciously withdrawn in the Parliament.

Over the years, Muslim intellectuals who advocate reinterpretation of Islamic teachings in the context of contemporary realities, although they seldom make headlines, have always been a real moral force in Indonesian society. It is to these intellectuals that the mass of Indonesian Muslims gravitated at the turn of the century.

In the elections last year, one Islamic party performed well i.e. the Justice and Prosperity Party (PKS). But it brought up no religious issue. It campaigned on the issue of corruption and governance, the same reformist issue that catapulted President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono into power. Once again, moderate Islam in Indonesia spoke through the ballot.

Not every Indonesian Muslim is a moderate. There are a small number of extremists in Indonesian society—and they are not all Muslims—who have resorted to violence to advance their respective agenda. Thus, for many years, Indonesia grappled with terrorist activities—some of which were motivated by religious intolerance, others by separatist ambitions. These terrorist activities were at the outset purely homegrown but eventually acquired regional and international linkages in the early 1990s. At that time, Indonesia was already advocating within ASEAN a strengthening of regional cooperation to fight terrorism. When terrorists struck in the United States on 9-11, Indonesia, naturally, was among the first countries to condemn the carnage in the strongest terms. Immediately after 9-11, Indonesia urged the international community to form a global coalition involving all civilizations and religions to wage a struggle against terrorism.

In October 2002, Indonesia itself suffered a massive terrorist bombing attack in Bali, which killed 202 persons. Since then, terrorists have struck with murderous effect, twice in Jakarta—at the Marriott Hotel in August 2003 and at the vicinity of the Australian Embassy in September 2004—and once again in Bali last October. In the wake of each of these attacks, Indonesia responded in the way a democracy should: balancing security needs, democratic process, and respect for human rights. Our police authorities brought the perpetrators to justice through patient investigation and without any violation of human rights. We could not have done less than that, as it was demanded by our people. Because of our recent past experience, the Indonesian people are very sensitive to the way our police or and the rest of the security apparatus works.

At the same time, we stepped up cooperation with other governments within ASEAN and in the Asia-Pacific region, to deny terrorists the financial and other kinds of support that makes them so effective. But in the long run, our success in the fight against terrorism would depend on our efforts to empower the moderates—the overwhelming majority of our people. There is a need to strengthen their voice of moderation. Hence, Indonesia has been very active in sponsoring dialogues on interfaith cooperation at the regional, inter-regional and global level. The Government is working closely with such Islamic organizations as the Nahdlatul Ulama and the Muhammadiyah in promoting these dialogues.

Indonesia has convened the first ever International Conference of Islamic Scholars in February 2004, the Asia-Pacific Dialogue on Interfaith Cooperation in December 2004, and the Asia-Europe Intefaith Dialogue in July 2005. We opened up avenues for dialogue so that we can effectively fight the terrorists on ideological grounds for the hearts and minds of the people. In fact, Muslim clerics and intellectuals are today leading the ideological war against terrorism, having formed a task force to rebut extremist ideas being propagated by terrorists and their supporters. While the police are bringing terrorists to justice—or killing them if they resist lawful arrest—the government and Muslim leaders are working together to kill terrorist ideas through peaceful and democratic debate.

This, then, is the sum of Indonesia’s experience with Islam and democracy: true Islam is moderate and enlightened. Not only can it flourish side by side with democracy, it can also work together with a democratic government to defend society from its attackers, and to reform society. There is no debate about that any more—not in Indonesia and not in various other Muslim countries.

The Indonesian experience confirms the fact that democracy is not an exclusively Western value that may sometimes be transplanted to the Orient—it is universal. It belongs to all civilizations. It belongs as much to Muslims, Hindus and Buddhists as to Christians. For there is a pattern in history that wherever human beings begin to take a passionate view of their own dignity and the equal dignity of all their fellowmen, they will find no other acceptable form of governance than democracy. That is why the number of democracies in the world today is inexorably increasing—in Asia, in Africa and even in the Middle East.

It was Winston Churchill who told the British House of Commons, “Democracy is the worst form of government, except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.” Jawaharlal Nehru of India meant the same thing when he said, “Democracy is good. I say this because all other systems are worse.” The debate on the merits of democracy and its compatibility with Islam is over. The challenge in Indonesia today is how to make Islam and all other religions an even more effective force for reform and democratization. It is a pragmatic challenge that demands a pragmatic response. Democracy, too, has its pragmatic challenge: how can we make our democracy an effective one? To my mind, the answer to that challenge lies in an earnest effort at capacity building—such as the capacity for free and fair elections, the capacity to pass just and wise laws, the capacity to mete out justice. In sum, we have to make democracy work for the welfare of our people.

I also believe that this national capacity building for democracy becomes more effective when complemented with a parallel effort at the regional level. That is why political development, especially the promotion of a just, democratic and harmonious environment, is one of the most important activities in realizing the concept of an ASEAN Security Community—as proposed and championed by Indonesia. It is an important part of our efforts to transform ASEAN into a community of nations, working together for peace, progress, and prosperity. The democratic impulse is alive and vigorous in many countries of the Asia-Pacific and there is much that we can learn from their experiences and best practices. There is also much from our own experiences and the insights derived from these experiences that we can share with them.

Each democracy is the product of a country’s unique history, culture, geography and other realities—as well as universal values. It is said, and I agree, that democracies never look alike, but there is always a family resemblance. But even after such capacity building, there are no guarantees that a country’s attempt at democracy will succeed. The infrastructures of democracy are not unlike physical infrastructures: they are useful and indispensable but they do not work by themselves. It takes human beings to make them work. In the final analysis, it takes good citizens—good men and women—to make democracy work. Decent men and women who are imbued with civic discipline and high values—such as the discipline and values of Islam.


Jakarta, 6 December 2005

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The EU and the US: a declaration of interdependence

By Manuel Barosso
Washington, 18 October 2005 SP/05/622

Ladies and gentlemen,

Let me start by thanking the School of Advanced International Studies, its Dean, Professor Jessica Einhorn, and Professor Dan Hamilton for inviting me to speak to you all. Through his distinguished career, Professor Hamilton has done much to promote transatlantic understanding. So it is fitting that he has become the Director of the EU Centre of Excellence Washington DC.

Today, I am proud to join you in inaugurating this centre of excellence, part of a network of ten such centres across the US which are supported by the European Commission. Its research and activities, particularly its successful outreach to the Washington policy community, will be invaluable in drawing Europe and America even closer together. This is an important goal which I want to look at more closely with you.

I’ll begin by quoting a - slightly modified - document which you may be familiar with:

When, in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for two peoples to strengthen the political bands which connect them to each other, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to this co-operation.

Of course I am not the first to try my hand at an EU/US ‘Declaration of Interdependence’. President Kennedy did an excellent job back in 1962. But it is important to ask: what are the causes impelling us towards closer co-operation?

I could start with the usual self-evident truths: our deep historical links; our shared respect for freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law; our two-way direct investment stock, worth almost $2 trillion; the 14 million jobs on both sides of the Atlantic which depend on our commercial ties. This is indeed an impressive list. But today there is an even greater cause impelling us to tighten our relationship, and I will return to this in a moment.

First of all, though, a word or two about events back home. There has been a lively market for euro-pessimists recently, thanks to Europe’s sluggish economic performance, the double ‘no’ to the European Constitution, and the ongoing failure of Europe’s leaders to agree on the next financial perspectives.

However, Europe has gone through many difficult periods in the past, and emerged stronger as a result. And it is important, at times like these, not to discount the more fundamental achievements of the European Union.

Sixty or seventy years ago, battles were being fought across the continent which killed millions of Europeans. Attempted genocide lead to the horrors of the Holocaust, a mass murder of Europeans by Europeans. Thirty-five years ago, dictatorships were still ruling many European countries, including my own. Just fifteen years ago the countries in Central and Eastern Europe recovered their freedom. And this year is the tenth anniversary of the massacres of Srebrenica. So when we talk about the power of Europe to spread peace, stability and prosperity, we are not talking about ancient history. In other words, if the EU didn’t exist, we would have to invent it. But the EU does exist. So let me outline how we are renewing it.

First of all, we have refused to allow the current difficulties over the Constitution, regrettable as they are, to become an excuse for paralysis. The world will not stop while Europe engages in a bout of introspection. And there are pressing challenges to tackle in the meantime.

Chief among these is the urgent need to boost growth and jobs, by injecting new vitality into Europe’s flagging economies. The renewed Lisbon Strategy for growth and jobs is not some empty marketing slogan, it is the main priority of my Commission. That is because everything flows from this. More growth and more jobs are the surest way of restoring our citizens’ confidence in Europe. A stronger European economy is also crucial to face up to greater international competition. Growth will make reform of Europe’s economic and social models easier, while at the same time laying strong foundations for our social and environmental ambitions.

We are also agreed on the importance of Europe remaining open to the world. As the largest trading bloc in the world, this is in some ways just enlightened self interest. But there is an element of moral responsibility, too.

Having stumbled across such a successful formula for spreading peace and stability on our own continent, it is only natural to offer our know-how and experience to encourage peace and stability elsewhere in the world. And while the EU’s foreign policy architecture could hardly be described as streamlined, we have nevertheless been chalking up an increasing number of successes in recent years. Let me highlight one or two.

The EU’s commitment to rebuild and stabilize the Indonesian province of Aceh since the tsunami is a good example of our work in post-conflict and post-disaster situations. It has contributed 85% of funding for the Multi-Donor Trust Fund, which is co-chaired by the European Commission. Following an invitation from the Indonesian Foreign Minister, the EU has also played a key role in monitoring the ongoing Aceh peace process.

Now the Commission is putting together a support package to sustain that peace process. One component of this will support reintegration of former fighters of the ‘Free Aceh Movement’. The other component will support the government and local authorities in implementing all aspects of the peace agreement related to governance, the judiciary and consolidation of democracy in the province. This means building up capacity in local and provincial administrations, training police, prosecutors and magistrates, and supporting preparations for local elections scheduled for next April.

Another example is our action in Afghanistan. Obviously, a lot of our activities there are carried out shoulder-to-shoulder with our American colleagues. Some 80% of the troops in the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force come from EU Member States. But we are doing a lot of work independently as well, to help with the reconstruction and political transition process in Afghanistan - albeit in close harmony with the US.

The EU paid half the cost of last year’s Presidential election, and made a substantial contribution to the recent parliamentary and provincial elections. The European Commission is delivering on its €1 billion pledge for 2002-2006, supporting a combination of visible reconstruction, like a major road from Kabul to Jalalabad; tangible benefits for the population, like health services and rural development; and the building up of lasting administrative capacity. In fact in 2004 alone, we rebuilt 120 clinics which treated 400,000 people, built 50 schools and kindergartens, and de-mined 8 million square metres of land.

So if America is now listening to Europe more, I think it is because we have worked hard to be worth listening to. If America is increasingly defining EU/US relations by what we can do together to promote democracy and freedom, it is because we have shown we can deliver results on the world stage. And notwithstanding the referendum results on the European Constitution, there is consistently high support among Europe’s citizens for the EU to play an even larger role in foreign affairs.

In this context, it is not surprising that Europe and America’s bilateral political relationship has led to a lot of good co-operation recently – on Iran, where our co-ordination of policy has been exemplary; on China, with the setting up of a strategic dialogue on East Asia to address economic and security challenges; and on Ukraine and Lebanon, promoting democracy.

Our close co-operation on the broader Middle-East is also a major success story. We have common interests there and a shared vision of where we want to get to. The EU strongly supports the G8 BMENA initiative and the Forum for the Future. And that is above and beyond our unique contribution through the Barcelona process, which is now in its 10^th year. The EU spends $3.6 billion in grants and loans to the region each year. From 2007, our spending in the area will include a 10% governance bonus, to reward progress in good governance and human rights. We must ensure that BMENA and the Barcelona process are complementary and mutually reinforcing. But we must not let this new-found focus on our bilateral political relationship distract us from our equally important bilateral economic relationship. It is important to keep a balance.

As books like Deep Integration - edited by Professor Hamilton and Joseph Quinlan here at the Centre for Transatlantic Relations – show, the increasing integration and cohesion of the transatlantic economy is a key feature of the global economic landscape today.

But there are still many obstacles which prevent us from realising the full potential of the transatlantic market. By pushing forward the economic initiative which we agreed at the EU/US Summit in June, we will help prepare ourselves for the economic challenges coming from China and India. Our citizens also need to see that the EU/US partnership works for them.

A couple of priorities I raised with President Bush this morning were the need to finalise the open aviation area agreement, which will benefit both the industry and 40 million annual transatlantic passengers, and the issue of visa-free access to the US for the new EU Member States. All our citizens and businessmen and women need to travel freely to benefit from, and contribute to, the transatlantic market place.

Ladies and gentlemen,

With such a deep and broad partnership holding us together, with our long ties of shared history and kinship, what could I possibly have been referring to at the start of this speech when I spoke of the ‘even greater cause’ impelling us to tighten our relationship today?

Well, it is no exaggeration to say that this cause is the greatest political and economic phenomenon of our generation. It has already lifted millions of people out of poverty and it is changing the geopolitical map. It is, of course, globalisation. It is important to remember that this is not the first wave of globalisation the world has ever witnessed. But it is by far the broadest and the deepest. It is sustained by accelerating technological progress, and its transformation of the world is only just starting.

People standing on the threshold of social and technological revolutions should never make predictions. The chairman of IBM proved this at the dawn of the IT revolution when he said: ‘I think there is a world market for maybe five computers’. So I will not be so rash as to make any forecasts about the type of world which will emerge from the ‘globalisation revolution’.

But one thing I am sure of. The changes it is already generating are profound, rapid and, short of some catastrophe which no-one would wish for, irreversible. Look at China and India, which I mentioned earlier. China is increasing its energy production capacity at the rate of a new power station every two weeks. In 1999, its foreign trade was equivalent to that of the Netherlands, one small EU Member State. In 2002 it overtook the UK. Now China ranks third in the world in terms of its volume of foreign merchandise trade, after the EU and the US. How many of you think it will remain in third position?

If China’s new dynamism is driven by manufacturing, then India’s comes from services. I read recently that there are 2 million new GSM subscribers there every month. India is tapping into a European, indeed, global demand for efficient services.

What does all this mean? It certainly isn’t something to fear. Globalisation is being driven by a very simple human desire – the desire of billions of people to take advantage of new-found freedoms to create a better life for themselves and their families. Who could criticise that?

And if some of our citizens fear globalization, perhaps it is because they think that wealth creation is a zero-sum game. That if someone else is now getting a slice of cake, their slice must be getting smaller. But globalization is a chance to increase the size of the whole cake.

We must challenge those who do not – or worse, will not – understand this. Did the emergence and rise of the USA since 1776 diminish Europe’s prosperity? Of course not! On the contrary, it fuelled unrivalled prosperity on both sides of the Atlantic. There is no reason why China, India or Latin America cannot reap similar rewards from what is going on today.

But globalisation does make the future more unpredictable. It makes it harder for any one country to go it alone. In these circumstances, it is in everyone’s interest to strengthen and support the international community’s multilateral, rules-based architecture. The stability and continuing economic development of the world could depend on it.

The EU and the US, working in partnership, are uniquely placed to offer leadership here. In these times of rapid change, we have a greater interest than ever before in stepping up our relationship in order to provide that leadership. As President Bush said at his inauguration: ‘All that we seek to achieve in the world requires that America and Europe remain close partners’.

We should start with the WTO’s Hong Kong Ministerial in December. The Doha Development Agenda is the most important challenge we face in international economic co-operation. The days when deals were struck in the wings of bilateral EU-US agreements are over. But we do still have a crucial role and responsibility in responding to the aspirations the Round has aroused. And we need a success for multilateral co-operation.

The main area where the EU and US must show leadership is agriculture. In this respect, I very much welcome the recent, constructive steps by the US on agricultural domestic support, and the readiness to match the EU's own willingness to eliminate all export subsidy programmes. Of course, any ambitious deal on agriculture is also subject to improved and substantive new market access opportunities in industrial products and services, in developed and emerging markets. Together, the EU and US must push for this and lead by example.

The Hong Kong Ministerial will also have to show to the developing world that we are serious in addressing their specific concerns. I therefore call on the US to take up a firm commitment to grant duty and quota free access to products from least developed countries. This would be a strong gesture in terms of development and faith in market openness. But the cornerstone of the international community’s multilateral architecture is the UN, which owes its existence to the far-sightedness of the Roosevelt and Truman administrations.

In the report of the bipartisan Task Force on the United Nations, Newt Gingrich and George Mitchell recognised how important it was for the UN to ‘reconfirm its place in today’s transformed international environment’, stating explicitly that ‘an effective United Nations is in the interests of the United States’.

The UN Summit in September was the best moment for that to happen. Unfortunately, the summit can at best be described, as I said at the time, as a ‘mitigated success’. The establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission was evidently a good outcome, and the progress made on development was more or less satisfactory, but the results clearly fell short of our ambitions regarding the Human Rights Council and the environment. Nevertheless, it is important to see the Summit as part of a process and not as the end of one.

The ultimate success of this process will depend on our actions in the months to come, including in the IMF/World Bank annual meetings this autumn on debt; at the WTO Hong Kong Ministerial as I mentioned earlier; and in the UN itself, during the follow-up on - among other things - the Human Rights Council and the Peacebuilding Commission. Once again, joint leadership from the EU and the US could make all the difference.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Strong, multilateral institutions, while more important than ever before, are not an end in themselves. They are simply tools for promoting peace, stability and economic development.

Without them, however, the world would unquestionably be a poorer and more dangerous place. It would also be much harder to deliver effective solutions to those problems that transcend national borders. Problems like climate change. Like transmissible diseases and pandemics. Like international terrorism.

That is why I would argue that while independence from the Old World must have seemed so attractive to Josiah Bartlett and his friends back in 1776, today it is our interdependence that promises so much.

Thank you.

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The Middle Class & Bourgeoisie in Indonesia

By Perry PADA

The growing expansion of the middle class and the bourgeoisie in Indonesia is an interesting phenomenon to be examined; the important question to address is this: are they an agent of social change? Studies of the Indonesian middle class and bourgeoisie are in their infancy both in terms of theorizing this social category in its Indonesian context and assembling a systematic and comprehensive set of data to support any wide ranging quantitative as well as qualitative conclusion. Most demographic studies have tended to focus on such factors as income raising, urbanization, regional stability, changing age structures and family planning, rather than class stratum and structure, although there has been some work done on the industrial labor force or working class struggles, but it is insufficient to explain the role of the middle class and bourgeoisie within the complexity of Indonesian social and political development.

The main question is what is the impact of the middle class on transformation of Indonesian society and culture? Will they create a greedier and more individualistic or more a community oriented and democratic society? Do they want the rule of law, other than for the purpose of protecting property, civil rights and freedom of speech and the accountability and transparency of government and the bureaucracy? Will they support any regime that protects their new found privilege?

Based on the growing reality of materialism in the era of consumerism which can be clearly seen in many big cities in Indonesia, one can easily jump to the pessimistic conclusion as to the direction of change preferred by the middle class. It is generally agreed that the traditional or middle class’ conception in favor of social justice, human rights and democracy has been replaced by a concern for career ambitions and the cultivation of consumerist materialistic lifestyles. Therefore, it is no wonder that the many night clubs are growing fast, Elite clubs, the have clubs and the like are frequently seen in the city across the country -- the so called upper level society lifestyle is becoming the dream to be achieved for the emerging middle class. At this juncture, the new middle class, it is argued, is merely prepared to fight for narrow personalistic interests devoid of social ideals. This is not surprising, according to many of the commentators, given that the existing middle class is clearly not autonomous in term of its relation to the state system and market influences. The emerging society with its capitalist ideology therefore cannot be avoided in Indonesia, or can it? They only project their opportunities in terms of improving their position within the channels of the state institutions and within the confines of its ideology.

Barrington Moore’s dictum, ‘no bourgeoisie’, no democracy’ may well be true, but it doesn’t follow that the presence of the bourgeoisie necessary implies liberal democracy or that this class will support democratic reform in all circumstances. The Indonesian bourgeoisie differs from Barrington Moore’s notion. The bourgeoisie in Indonesia found its interest embedded in state and market regimes. Additionally, in Indonesia, the potential of the bourgeoisie to establish itself as the ruling class is limited because the state is dominated by Indonesian conglomerates whose public political and social rule is dictated by their own interests and ambition.

Employing Moore’s idea concerning the ability of the bourgeoisie to initiate change, one may pessimistically conclude because it is difficult to envisage them as standing for some redistribution of wealth in Indonesia. From the socio-economic perspective, big oligarch business tends to support their own social class while seeking support from the state/government policy thereby excluding other voices. A big part of oligarch business in Indonesia is not native either in people or in resources and therefore they do not have the inclination to pursue traditionally critical politics. On the other hand the native businessmen whose growth flourishes in Indonesia usually have a link to power. They do not have any interest to change the system because they benefit from it. Another group can be found among the workers, but without sufficient strength to lead a movement for change. The clear reason is that the Indonesian working class is voiceless due to its social vulnerability.

It can also be stated that the Indonesian class structure is unfavorable to real democracy, but at best can be characterized as engaged in procedural democracy of general elections or the existing pluralism of political parties and the long list of formalistic procedures. The independent bourgeoisie and the working class, that have historically been associated with the rise of democracy, are small and relatively powerless in Indonesia. The relatively low level of urbanization and industrialization -- two-thirds of the population earn a living from agricultural activities means that the middle and working classes are relatively undeveloped. This is a problem as history validates the view that it is the working class and sections of the middle class who have been most inclined to the democratic process. The business class in Indonesia is also said to be highly dependent on state power while deeply dependent to overseas credit or donors. A compounding problem is that key components of the business class are ethnic Chinese, who as a minority are politically vulnerable and therefore even more dependent on state protection.

The middle class and bourgeoisie have been heavily dependent upon the state for jobs, careers, contracts and monopolies and more broadly, as the engine of economic growth. Hence they have been reluctant to upset the balance of power of the state and the ascendancy of the stratum of politico -bureaucrats. In other words, the middle class and the bourgeoisie have not yet established their ascendancy as socially dominant forces autonomous of the state and the market. They still require the financial resources and coercive power of the state to preserve the social order.

Depok, 19 Mei 2006

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China’s Foreign Relations : A Historical and Cultural Perspective.

By Perry PADA

One can better understand China’s external relations, even, today, by turning back the pages of history to ancient times. Beginning with Qin dynasty and Han in the 3rd century BC up to the end of Qing dynasty at 19 century, China claim itself as a “Middle Kingdom” ( Zhungguo ), center of the world, especially in Asia. China perceived itself as the only great empire on the Earth, the only civilization and the only culture that really mattered for human being. The emperor or Son of Heaven-represents all man kind, whether Chinese or Barbarian. The emperor was the crucial link the mediator between heaven and earth, and he enjoyed the mandate to rule all men (mandate of Heaven).

The Chinese, therefore, had some good reasons for thinking themselves as the originators and heirs of the only civilization in their world. The Pacific Ocean led only to Japan, itself in culture a pupil and adopter of the Chinese civilization. The immense deserts and steppes beyond the great wall were the home of China’s traditional and ‘savage’ enemies, the Tartars--under many successive names. To the south were tropical jungles and a few centers of emergent civilizations whose cultures, when not directly from China itself, were of Indian origin. The west was barred off by the immense massif mountain of Tibet, largely too high to inhabit and such valleys were permitted settled by ‘savages’.

China traditionally divided the world into five majors region. First region, consist of 18 provinces, which is traditional region and completely under China’s control . This region spread out from the big wall in the north to Indochina in the South, and high land in the west to East China Sea.

Second region, consist of Tibet, Sinxiang, Outer Mongolia, Manchuria, shore islands, and some tributary states such as Korea and Annam. China perceived the first and second as the vital region, hence as a region requiring protection.

The third region consist of a large part of tributary states along china’s border such as Ryuku, Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Himalaya, Malaysia, and a part of Kalimantan. Even though this region was claimed as china’s interest region, but the above region much more important for China.

The Fourth region consists of other Asia nations such as India, Pakistan, Papua nuigini, Indonesia, and Iran. And the fifth region, consist of Europe countries, America and Africa. China perceived these nations as barbars and therefore was never treated equally.

With this world order, China thus claimed to a position of dominance and centrality in the Asian states system. This relate to a conception of their land as a middle kingdom, to which adjoining states owed tribute as political and cultural satellites. This order is called a tributary system, which is hierarchically ordered with China as the central power (Zungguo) who arranges that order. With this order, it is not weird that Chinese people perceived themselves as more intelligent, more civilize and more capable than other nations.

Further more, it is not simply that Chinese regarded their culture as superior in a material and aesthetic sense; they believe it to be superior, and universally valid. Though non Chinese people were not forced to acknowledge and adopt Chinese superiority, they were somewhat despised if they neglected the opportunity. Hence traditional China was based on the assumptions that it was logical for all people to follow its values; also China had a special role to protect these values. These assumptions still sustain contemporary China’s Communist Party (CCP) leaders to the present.

The root of culture and ideology

The Chinese image of world order is also colored by the assumptions, values and beliefs of the Confucian moral order. Indeed, the traditional Chinese image of world order was no more than a corollary of the Chinese image of internal order, and thus really an extended projection of its self image. Hence, the chief concern of China’s traditional foreign policy centered upon the ways and means of making diplomatic practice conform to the idealized self image.

The essence of Chinese world order was sinocentric cosmology. China perceived herself to the center of human civilization - hence the name of middle kingdom and the son of heaven as the conception to have the right to reign and rule over all human affairs. Although pre-Confucian in origin, the notion a universal state ruled by a universal king developed and culminated in the state orthodoxy of the Confucian order. In the orthodox Confucian conception, the political status quo has to be preserved in the Chinese world order through a universal symbolization of harmony that was hierarchical and anti egalitarian, based on sex, kinship, age and social function. Confucianism heavy lays stress on the doctrine of superordination-subordination in the five relationships as well as in the distinction between the superior men who work with their brains and the inferior men who labor with their muscles. Thus, because of the world of Chinese as a reflection of domestic stratification, the hierarchical of social order at home provided an absolute criterion for conceptualizing China’s relations with non-Chinese states.

Limited contacts with west and the Byzantine world during the Tang Dynasty (618-906) merely confirmed the rightness of the sinocentric image. Even the Buddhist invasion, the most serious foreign challenge to Chinese culture until modern times, failed to modify Chinese perceptions. The Indian world view as expresses in Buddhism was devoid of political imperative. While Buddhism exerted a substantial and lasting influence on art and religious thought in traditional China, it had little political impact on Chinese cosmology. Even the alien conquerors--Yuan and Ch’ing-- contributed to reinforcing the sinocentric world order or in other word we may say as “signified “process or sinicization.

Western Penetration and treaty system

In the beginning 19th century, British, French, Dutch and US were the nations dealing trade with China, although their trade activities were limited to a certain region and only contact with the government was allowed. At that time western trader viewed that opium is the only commodity attracting Chinese. Therefore their activities concentrated on this commodity.

War between China and British (opium war) in 1839-1842 and along with the very fast intrusion of technology, culture, economy and politic penetration, challenged the traditional pattern in china . Qing dynasty begin to be weaken because the inability of the king to overcome the repression of domestic rebellion and west penetration in the ports area.

The defeat suffered by China in the opium war ushered in a new era of Sino-western relations. The age old tribute system was dealt a heavy blow, and a new treaty system was inaugurated by four “peace treaties” signed between Chinese and western powers. Taken together these treaties established a general frame work for commercial and diplomatic relations between Chinese and the west. At the end of 19 century, western ambition increased. China’s ports were taken over by them such as Honking and Weihaiwei to British, Qiangdao to Germany, Macao to Portugal, Guang zhouwan to French and Dahlian to Rusia. Most part of Chinese territory were claimed by western countries and were under their influence. To the north, Tsarist Rusia tried to establish its control in Manchurian and Xianjiang. Russia also succeeded to have Maritime province in Vladivostok in 1860. Through series of treaties imposed by western , particularly a series of peace treaties signed at Tiensin, however , opened “a pandora’s box” for the traditional Chinese image of world order. China unwillingly accepted and recognized the western nations in their territory widely and freely. This experience was to shape the course of Chinese international relations.

Chinese history as I elaborated above contributed a strong felling for modern Chinese leaders concerning China’s status and national integration. In fact the history of China, their belief, culture and values shaped China’s as a great nation as we see today. Chinese Communist leaders has a highly national consciousness towards their glorious and bitterness of the past. According to Mao, “China is a nation who has glorious tradition. Even though sometimes that glory is affected by Barbarian, we always succeeded to defeat them with revolutionary facilities”. Regarding the unity and national integration, in 1939, Mao Zedong expressed the same felling by saying that “Imperialist force had seized china’s territory”, such as Korea, Taiwan, Rukyu islands, Pescadores, Port Arthur, Burma, Nepal, Honking, Annam, and Macao. Mao gave his promise that “ Chinese will not be humiliated by others any more and we will struggle to the next eight years, maybe ten years, or more. And, we will show to the world, what kind of nation we are”. Therefore, the assumptions about the lost territories proved that the middle kingdom conception and tributary system still ingrained in the thinking China communist leaders.

Even though traditional aspects have a great influence, China image of the world is very determined by the characteristic of Chinese communism. This characteristic (especially Mao’s though) combined with the root of culture subsequently creates China communist image of the world order.

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(1) Harry Harding, China and Northeast Asia: The Political dimension (New York: University Press of America),p.5-6.

(ii) C.P. Fritzgerald, “Chinese view the world” Year book of World Affairs, 1981, p.156.

(iii) Harding, China and Northeast Asia, p.5.

(iv) Michael H. Hunt, Chinese Foreign Policy in Historical Perspective” in Harry Harding, China Foreign Relation 1980s (New Heaven : Yale University Press,1984),p.5.

(v) North, The foreign relations,p.54.

(vi) John Crammer-Byng, “The Chinese View of Their Place in the world” A Historical Perpective,” China Quarterly, No.53 (January/Maret, 1973).p.68.

(vii) Samuel S.Kim, China, The United Nations, and the World order (New Jersey:Princeton University Press, 1979).p.20.

(viii) North, The Foreign Relations, p. 54-55.

(ix) Paul H. Clyde, The Far East (New Jersey: Prentice Hall,1958),p.21

(x) Harding, China and Northeast Asia.,p.55-56

(xi) Kim, China, the United Nations.,p.36

(xii) North, The Foreign Relations,p.56.

(xiii) See, A.Doak Barnett, Communist China and Asia: A challange to Amrican Policy (New York:Random House,1960),p.76.

(xiv) As quoted by Liu from China Digest (October 5,1946) in China as A nuclear Power.,p.15

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