Jakarta is flooded (with money)

Feb 7th 2007
From Economist.com


The case for more and better public spending

MUCH of Indonesia’s capital, Jakarta, was under water this week, after heavy rains overwhelmed drainage systems. At least 36 were left dead and around 340,000 homeless. The disaster underlined the need for more and better public works, from drains and water pipes to electricity and roads.

In the aftermath of the 1997 Asian economic crisis Indonesia had a good excuse for public neglect: lack of money. It was laden with debt, and no-one was keen to lend more. But things have changed. Successive governments have worked hard to improve national finances, through reforms including deep cuts in fuel subsidies last year.

A World Bank study due next week is expected to conclude that Indonesia now has plenty of cash available to invest―but seems to have lost the knack of doing so.

The bank thinks 2007 could be a year of great opportunity, if Indonesia can only take advantage of its improved finances and get moving on economy-boosting public works. It takes a similar view of the Philippines, South-East Asia’s other giant democracy.

Indonesia’s public debt has fallen below 40% of GDP, cutting interest obligations. The country recently declared “independence” from the International Monetary Fund, having paid off the last of its loans. The Jakarta stockmarket and the rupiah have been strong, reflecting foreign investors’ renewed interest. This week, as the government was preparing to issue up to $2 billion in bonds, it got a boost from Moody’s, a credit-rating agency, which said it was considering an upgrade.

But despite all the improved fundamentals, the World Bank reckons that Indonesia's investment in infrastructure, both public and private, amounts now to only 3% of GDP, against 5-6% before the Asian crisis.

President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono is fond enough of drawing up grand plans for public works. But politics keeps them on the drawing board. Stephen Sherlock, a political scientist, says vital legislation gets stuck in frequent stalemates between president and Parliament, both of whom need to approve it.

Another obstacle to investment, strangely enough, is Mr Yudhoyono’s campaign against corruption. For fear of being hauled before a new anti-corruption court, civil servants have become reluctant to sign documents authorising public spending.

A third problem is the decentralisation that was a key part of Indonesia’s democratisation. Provincial and municipal governments now get 40% of all tax revenues, but have not yet worked out how to spend the money efficiently. The World Bank reckons they have cash to the tune of 3% of GDP idling in their bank accounts.

Things are much the same in the Philippines. Quarrels between presidency and parliament have meant that this year’s budget has only just been passed. All public works will be halted again soon, ahead of congressional elections in May, for fear they might be used for electioneering. This week attempts to auction the national electricity grid to private investors failed for a fourth time. As in Indonesia, firms are deterred by inadequate, outdated laws and weak property rights.

Unlike, say, Brazil, where there is a strong case for taxing less and leaving more money in people's pockets, South-East Asian countries tend to tax lightly. There would be plenty of space for private investment, as well as public, if only regulation and administration worked better. Indonesia and the Philippines have thrown off authoritarian regimes only recently: it is understandable if they go a bit heavy on the checks and balances. But the price of these is sluggish government, and lost opportunity.

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Indonesia : The alternative to war - A landmark in the peace process

From The Economist print edition - AFP

INDONESIA'S province of Aceh, once a byword for the intractability of conflict, is witnessing one of the world's most successful peace processes. That process passed an important milestone on December 11th, when voters went to the polls for the first direct elections for the provincial governor and 19 of the 21 district chiefs.

Sixteen months ago the region on the northern tip of Sumatra was mired in a 29-year-long separatist conflict that had claimed 12,000 lives. And it was reeling from the massive earthquake and tsunami the previous December that killed some 170,000 people across the province and left 500,000 homeless.

The disaster opened the eyes of both the government in Jakarta and the rebel Free Aceh Movement (GAM) to Aceh's war-weariness. A peace deal was struck in August 2005. Since then, events have unfolded more hopefully than anyone could have predicted. Under the supervision of monitors led by the European Union, GAM disarmed and Indonesian troops returned to barracks. A law was passed granting Aceh generous autonomy.
Held amid unprecedented traffic jams, the optimism surrounding the election was palpable. Official results will not be declared until January. But two separate and reliable counts from several hundred sample polling stations predict the next governor will be Irwandi Yusuf. He is a former Gam commander, who escaped from prison when the tsunami knocked down the front wall. He went on to help negotiate the peace deal and then became GAM's representative on a joint security commission with the government.

Mr Irwandi and his running mate, Muhammad Nazar, another veteran independence activist, are forecast to have won about 39% of the vote. The second-placed pairing also included a Gam representative. So the movement in effect won 55.5% of the popular vote. This rejection of the Jakarta establishment was much more comprehensive than most observers, let alone the government, had foreseen.

It is not, however, a mandate to renew the war for independence. One credible exit poll revealed that protecting the peace process had three times more weight in determining voting decisions than did any other factor. Though he has no administrative experience, Mr Irwandi is expected to respect the popular will and cement the peace process rather than seek ways to dismantle it.

How the government in Jakarta will react is harder to predict. The army has matured enormously as an institution since it engineered widespread bloodletting in 1999 after East Timor voted for independence. But undisciplined individuals, not to mention disgruntled politicians, might hope to destabilise the province, especially with a view to the 2009 general election, when Gam should run for the first time as a reincarnated political party.

What, strangely enough, will probably help reduce political foul-play is the parlous state of Aceh's economy. While the traffic congestion may be a heartening sign, no one pretends that the apparent boom is anything other than temporary: one aspect of a huge bubble inflated by the post-tsunami reconstruction aid blowing into the province.

Some $2 billion has entered the local economy this year. But two years after the disaster, a sustainable recovery has yet to take root. That, however, may be a reason for optimism. Reconstruction should keep Mr Irwandi and other politicians with an eye on 2009 fully occupied. Until last August, ending the conflict and recovering from the tsunami were two distant and very separate dreams. The successful election means they have now fused into a single task, albeit a massive one.

Banda Aceh, Dec 13th 2006

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Perlukah Peranan Deplu di Daerah?

Oleh: Perry PADA

Berbagai bentuk perwakilan lembaga internasional telah cukup lama beroperasi di berbagai pelosok daerah di tanah air. Sebagai contoh, sebut saja, badan-badan UN, kantor-kantor NGOs Internasional dan LSM-LSM nasional yang didanai institusi asing. Belum lagi proyek-proyek bantuan asing dalam rangka kerjasama internasional, atau perusahaan-perusahaan multi nasional seperti Freeport, Exxon, Mobil Oil, ataupun P.T. Ali baba dan lain sebagainya.

Persinggungan langsung antara kepentingan daerah dan proyek asing tampaknya kurang mendapat perhatian para penyusun kebijakan nasional terutama dampaknya terhadap proses perubahan kehidupan sosial ekonomi dan politik masyarakat di daerah. Sebenarnya dengan semakin maraknya unsur asing di daerah merupakan tantangan dan kesempatan positif bagi pelaksanaan Politik Luar Negeri kita. Namun sayangnya upaya menuju kearah itu masih terus dalam ranah diskursus dan masih terbentur oleh arogansi sektoral dan birokrasi.

Kita sadar bahwa globalisasi menuntut penyusaian kebijakan dan program pembangunan dan hal tersebut merupakan suatu kebutuhan nasional guna mengantisipasi berbagai perubahan yang terjadi di berbagai level kehidupan masyarakat. Namun, persoalannya adalah sejauh mana kita mampu menyusun suatu kebijakan dan program guna memperdayakan masyarakat, khususnya di level daerah/provinsi sehingga diharapkan mampu meraih kesempatan dan menghindari kerugian akibat globalisasi. Berangkat dari pemahaman tersebut maka dibutuhkan suatu sinergi yang integrated antara pusat dan daerah dalam rangka mencapai tujuan pembangunan ekonomi nasional secara menyeluruh.


UU Otda da Hublu

Dalam rangka mengantisipasi, mengakomodasi perubahan pola hubungan luar negeri disamping sekaligus menyelaraskan arus global dan berbagai kepentingan nasional dalam setiap level of interst, Indonesia telah mengundangkan UU No. 37/1999 tentang hubungan luar negeri. UU Hublu tersebut juga memberikan justifikasi bahwa pemerintah bukanlah lagi satu-satunya lembaga pelaksana hubungan luar negeri. Pasal 1 ayat 1 menyebutkan bahwa :”Hubungan luar negeri adalah setiap kegiatan yang menyangkut aspek regional dan internasional ynag dilakukan oleh pemerintah di tingkat pusat dan daerah, atau lembaga-lembaganya, lembaga negara, badan usaha, organisasi politik, organisasi masyarakat, lembaga swadaya masyarakat, atau warga negara Indonesia.”

Dilain pihak UU No 22/99 dan UU no.32/1999 tentang Otonomi Daerah Khusus mengenai hubungan Luar negeri, pasal 88 (1) menyebutkan bahwa daerah dapat mengadakan kerjasama yang saling menguntungkan dengan lembaga/badan di luar negeri, yang diatur dengan keputusan bersama, kecuali menyangkut kewenangan pemerintah di bidang (1) Politik Luar Negeri, (2) Pertahanan Keamanan, (3) Peradilan, (4) Moneter dan Fiscal, (5) Agama, serta kewenangan bidang lain.

Terlepas adanya diskursus mengenai definisi “hubungan luar negeri” dan “kebijakan luar negeri”, namun jelas dari kedua UU diatas telah memberikan jaminan konstitusional dan peran yang sangat besar kepada daerah–daerah dan para pelaku hubungan luar negeri di daerah dalam menentukan bentuk kerjasama dengan negara dan atau lembaga-lembaga luar negeri. Dengan kata lain diplomasi tidak lagi monopoli pemerintah pusat tetapi merupakan pekerjaan berbagai elemen di daerah. Dengan UU tersebut maka pelaksanaan hubungan luar negeri telah dibagi rata dengan seluruh komponen bangsa.

Perlukah Peranan Deplu di Daerah?

Dalam rangka melaksanakan hubungan kerjasama Daerah dengan pihak asing, Deplu di tahun 2003 telah menerbitkan buku ‘Panduan Umum : Tatacara Hubungan Luar Negeri oleh Pemerintah Daerah”. Disamping itu Deplu juga telah menempatkan seorang stafnya di kantor Pemerintah Daerah masing-masing di Pemda Yogyakarta, Aceh dan Papua sebagai tugas perbantuan.

Penerbitan aturan petunjuk dan tugas perbantuan di Daerah merupakan perkembangan yang postif namun tidak cukup sampai disitu. Pemerintah Pusat Perlu dipertimbangkan untuk melembagakan kehadiran Deplu di daerah-daerah melalui suatu kebijakan nasional. Kebijakan ini sangat signifikan guna mendukung pelaksanaan hubungan luar negeri di daerah-daerah sebagai pelaksanaan kebijakan “one door policy”. Disamping itu Deplu dapat berperan sebagai kantor konsultan bagi para pelaku hubungan internasional di daerah baik itu local maupun asing. Ada banyak keuntungan nyata yang dapat diperoleh apabila Deplu membuka “kanwil” didaerah-daerah otonomi. Secara konsep antara lain manfaat yang dapat dicatat yaitu:

(1)Terdapat peta pemahaman yang komprehensif mengenai kebutuhan daerah yang bisa diatasi melalui kerjasama dengan pihak asing.
(2)Tercipta sinergi koordinasi kinerja antara Deplu, Pemerintah Daerah dan Perwakilan Indonesia di luar negeri sekaligus meningkatkan kinerja Perwakilan RI di luar negeri.
(3) Mencegah terjadinya ‘kesalahan’ kerjasama internasional yang dilaksanakan oleh daerah yang akan berdampak negative.
(4) Mempermudah penyusunan kebijakan hubungan luar negeri yang lebih akurat dan membumi.
(5) Pejabat Dinas Luar Negeri Indonesia lebih membumi yakni mampu melihat berbagai potensi daerah yang dapat “dijual” di pasar internasional sebelum ditempatkan di luar negeri.
(6) Menciptakan mesin-mesin diplomasi yang tersebar di seluruh pelosok daerah sebagai bagian dari total diplomasi.

Deplu membuka perwakilan di daerah bukan hal yang aneh, mengingat Departemen teknis lainnya seperti Hankam, Agama, Hukum, Keuangan telah memainkan peranannya di berbagai daerah. Atau kita bisa menengok bagaimana negara lain yang telah melakukan strategi membuka Kemlu di daerah – daerahnya, salah satu contoh adalah Kemlu China.

Sebaiknya kita lebih melihat politik luar negeri dengan kaca mata yang lebih “sederhana dan membumi” namun fokus yaitu sebagai instrument meningkatkan kemajuan pembangunan ekonomi nasional yang dimulai dengan promosi kepentingan daerah ke luar negeri dan bukan sebaliknya melihat hal-hal yang besar untuk kepentingan pencitraan diri namun tidak mendatangkan keuntungan ekonomi yang nyata. Akhirnya dengan lebih memperhatikan daerah kita berharap definisi kepentingan nasional semakin dapat dimaknai dan dimaterialkan dengan jelas.



Citayam, November 2006

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North Korea and the Limits of Multilateralism

By George Friedman
One of the main criticisms of the Bush administration's approach to Iraq has been that the United States undertook the war unilaterally, without consulting or working with allies and the international community. The criticism always overstated the United States' isolation among traditional allies: France and Germany opposed the 2003 invasion, but the United States had more support in NATO than did Paris and Berlin. Nevertheless, there was a principle embedded in U.S. policy that was real and could be challenged. George W. Bush took the view that the United States had to craft its own strategy after the 9/11 attacks -- and that, while it welcomed support, its actions would not be constrained by such considerations. The justification for a coalition was that it would enable U.S. policy; U.S. policy did not have to be justified by recourse to a coalition.

This was a conceptual shift in U.S. foreign policy. Alliance as Solution

A generation ago, there was a consensus about why World War II had happened, why the United States and Allied powers had won and how the Cold War should be prosecuted. In this reading, World War II was caused by the unwillingness of the international community to take action against Hitler early enough to prevent a war. The British and French, pursuing their own separate policies -- unwilling to join with the Soviet Union against the greater threat of a Nazi Germany and unable to use the moribund mechanism of the League of Nations -- failed to lead a decisive coalition against Hitler.

With war impossible to prevent, a coalition was created to fight Hitler and the Japanese. The coalition, under the rubric of the United Nations, involved a range of nations that were prepared to subordinate their particular national interests to the broader interest of defeating the Axis powers. Military success in the war rested on the ability of the coalition to hold together. And reading backward, had this coalition existed prior to the rise of Munich, World War II likely never would have happened. Maintaining global stability required a coalition of states that shared a mutual interest in stability and would suppress, as soon as possible, nations that would want to upset that stability.

The Cold War was fought on the same basis. Having accepted that the Soviets were a destabilizing power, the United States focused on creating a system of alliances to contain them. The Americans saw the rapid creation of an alliance against the Soviet Union as the foundation of a successful foreign policy; without it, the Soviets would be victorious.

Rhetoric aside, this made a great deal of sense. The Soviet Union emerged from World War II as the pre-eminent land power in Eurasia. The United States, by size and geography, could not unilaterally contain the Soviets. At best, it could engage in a catastrophic nuclear war with them. In order to have an effective conventional option, the United States had to have allies on the periphery of the Soviet Union. The alliance system made superb geopolitical sense.

Alliance as Stability

But the United States emerged from all of this with an obsession for alliance systems independent of purpose. The World War II coalition had a clear purpose: the defeat of the Axis powers. The Cold War coalition had a clear purpose as well: the defeat of the Soviet Union. However, what emerged in the 1990s was the idea of alliances as ends in themselves. The basic idea was that the system of alliances over which the United States presided during the Cold War would continue to exist -- not with the purpose of opposing the Soviets, but to maintain global stability. The only challenge this system would face, it was presumed, would be rogue powers -- which would be dealt with by an international community (a term extended to include Russia and China) that shared an equal interest in stability. Instead of opposing an enemy, the goal was in the positive: maintaining stability. If the goal was stability, and if everyone shared that goal, then simply having a coalition became the solution rather than the means to a solution.

The central assumption behind this approach was that all significant powers now shared a common interest -- stability -- and that the only destabilizing powers would be rogues, against which the international community would pool its forces. Desert Storm was the model: A broad coalition re-conquered Kuwait, with even nonparticipants in the war giving at least tacit approval. This principle was maintained until Kosovo.

Bush's policy on Iraq, therefore, became a battleground for those who argued that maintaining the alliance system had to take precedence over the unilateral pursuit of national interests. Leaving aside the important question of whether the invasion of Iraq made sense from the American point of view, one argument was that anything that alienates the coalition -- regardless of whether it is a good or bad idea -- is extremely dangerous because this alienation undermines international stability. More to the point, it undermines the foundations of what has been U.S. foreign policy since 1941 -- a foreign policy that was successful.

North Korea and Multilateralism

The counterargument, of course, is provided by history: Successful alliances are built for the purpose of dealing with threats. Alliances built around principles such as stability are doomed to fail, for a number of reasons. First, over time, the status quo appeals to some powers and not to others. Stability is another way of arguing that the international order should be maintained as it is, ignoring the fact that some powers are thereby placed at a great disadvantage. Apart from any moral argument, it follows that, with a universal commitment to stability, subordinate powers will permanently accept their positions, or leading powers will give up their positions quietly, without destabilizing the system. Thus, the idea of maintaining alliances for purposes of stability is built on an unlikely assumption: Stability is in the universal interest of the international community.

Which brings us to North Korea. The U.S. approach to North Korea -- and this includes that of the Bush administration -- consistently has been the polar opposite of its approach to Iraq. North Korea has provided the classic example of multilateralism in pursuit of stability as an end in itself.

The United States does not want North Korea to get nuclear weapons because this could destabilize the international system. Whatever its rhetoric, however, Washington has taken no steps to try to destabilize North Korea, focusing instead on changing its behavior through a multilateral approach.

On North Korea, then, the United States has scrupulously followed traditional U.S. foreign policy. First, Washington has consistently accepted the idea that it has a primary responsibility to deal with North Korea, even if there are regional powers that are in a position to do so. The United States has followed the principle that, as the world's leading power, it has unique obligations and rights in dealing with destabilizing powers. Second, the United States has used its position not for unilateral action, but for multilateral action. Washington has been pressured by North Korea for talks, and criticized by others for refusing to engage Pyongyang directly. Rather, the United States has insisted on the principle of shared authority and responsibility, working within the framework of regional powers that have an interest in North Korea: South Korea, China, Russia and Japan. Finally, the United States has made clear that it will not take unilateral military action against North Korea.

However, the multilateral approach pursued under both the Clinton and Bush administrations has failed, if we regard the detonation of a small nuclear device as constituting a failure. This is an important event because it is the complete counterpoint to Iraq, where it has been argued that failure resulted from the Bush administration's unilateral approach. In one case, we wind up with an unmanageable war; in the other, with the potential for a regional nuclear threat.

Shared Responsibility and Inaction

The driving assumption in the case of North Korea was that all of the powers involved were committed to regional stability, understood the risks of inaction and were prepared to take risks to maintain stability and the status quo. But that just wasn't true. There were very different, competing ideas of stability; the idea of inaction seemed attractive and the assumption of risks did not. There was no multilateral action because the coalition was an illusion.

Let's go down the list:

South Korea: Seoul does not want Pyongyang to have a nuclear device, but it also does not want the slightest chance of a war with North Korea -- South Korea's industrial heartland is too close to the border. Nor does Seoul want the regime in Pyongyang to fall; the idea of the South taking responsibility for rebuilding a shattered North Korea is not attractive. The South Koreans didn't want the North to acquire nuclear weapons, but they were not prepared to act to stop Pyongyang, or to destabilize the regime.

Japan: Japan does not want North Korea to have a nuclear device, but it is prepared neither to take military action on its own nor to endorse U.S. military action in this regard. Japan has major domestic issues with waging war that would have to be worked out before it could make a move, and it is no hurry to solve those problems. Moreover, Tokyo has little interest in posing such an overt threat that the Koreas, its traditional enemy, would reunify (as an industrial giant) against Japan. The Japanese don't mind imposing sanctions, but they hope they won't work.

Russia: Russia is about as worried about the prospect of a North Korean nuclear strike on its territory as the United States is about a French strike. The two countries may not like each other, but it isn't going to happen. Russia would smash North Korea and not worry about the fallout. But at the same time, Moscow wants to keep the United States tied up in knots. It has serious issues with the United States encroaching on the Russian sphere of influence in former Soviet territory. Russia is delighted to see the United States tied down in Iraq and struggling with Iran, and it is quite happy to have the Americans appear helpless over North Korea. The Russians will agree to some meaningless sanctions for show, but they are not going to make the United States appear statesmanlike.

China: China has major internal problems, both economic and political. The Chinese do not want to anger the United States, but they do want the Americans to be dependent on them for something. The North Korea test blast gave China an opportunity to appear enormously helpful without actually doing anything meaningful. Put another way, if China actually wanted to stop the detonation, it clearly has no influence on North Korea. And if it does have influence -- which we suspect it does -- it managed to play a complex double game, appearing to oppose the blast while taking advantage of its ability to "help" the United States. China, along with Russia, has no interest in serious sanctions.

The issue here is not the fine points of the foreign policies of these nations, but the fact that none has an overarching interest in "doing something" about North Korea. Each of these states has internal and external problems that take precedence, in their eyes, over a North Korean nuclear capability. None of them is pursuing stability, in the sense of being prepared to subordinate national interests to the stabilization of the region. The result is that the diplomatic process has failed.

Multilateralism: Promise and Limitations

In this case, multilateralism was the problem. By bringing together a coalition of nations with enormously diverse natures and interests, the United States was guaranteed paralysis. There was no commitment to any overarching principle, and the particular national interests precluded decisive action both before and after the nuclear test. Multilateralism provided an illusion of effective action in a situation where inaction -- including inaction by the United States -- was the intent. No one did anything because no one wanted to do anything, and this was covered up with the busywork of multilateral diplomacy.

It is not that multilateral action is useless. To the contrary, it was the foundation of U.S. success in World War II and the Cold War. When a clear and overwhelming interest or fear is present, multilateral action is essential. But invoking multilateralism as a solution in and of itself misses the point that there must be a more pressing issue at stake than the abstract notion of stability. Neither unilateralism nor multilateralism are moral principles. Each is a means of attaining the national interest. The U.S. disaster in Iraq derived less from pursuing unilateral ends than from catastrophic mismanagement of a war. The emergence of a nuclear North Korea results not from inherent weakness in a multilateral approach, but from using multilateralism as a substitute for a common interest.

If, for some, Iraq made the case against unilateralism, North Korea should raise serious questions about the limits of multilateralism.

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Red Alert: North Korea -- Is There a Military Solution?

By The Strategic Forcasting. Inc (STRATFOR)

Whatever the political realities may seem to dictate after a North Korean nuclear test, an overt military strike -- even one limited to cruise missiles -- is not in the cards. The consequences of even the most restrained attack could be devastating.

Analysis

The reported detonation of a nuclear device by North Korea on Oct. 9 raises the question of potential military action against North Korea. The rationale for such a strike would be simple. North Korea, given its rhetoric, cannot be allowed to have nuclear weapons. Therefore, an attack to deny them the facilities with which to convert their device into a weapon and deploy it is essential. If such an attack were to take place, it is assumed, the United States would play the dominant or even sole role.

This scenario assumes that North Korea is as aggressive as its rhetoric.

But what about North Korea's well-armed neighbors -- Russia, China, South Korea, Japan? Would they not be willing to assume the major burden of an attack against North Korea? Is the United States really willing to go it alone, even while engaged in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan?

Leaving these obvious political questions aside for the moment, let's reverse the issue by posing it in military terms: What would a U.S. strike against North Korea look like?

The USS Kitty Hawk is currently sitting in port at Yokosuka Naval Base, Japan. The USS Enterprise is operating in the Arabian Sea, while the Nimitz and the Stennis are conducting exercises off the coast of California. All are an ocean away, and none is less than a week's transit from the region. Nevertheless, naval cruise missiles are readily available, as are long-range strikes by B-2A Spirit stealth bombers and B-52H Stratofortresses and B-1B Lancers currently supporting NATO operations in Afghanistan out of Diego Garcia. A more robust strike package would take longer to deploy.

When U.S. military planners have nightmares, they have nightmares about war with North Korea. Even the idea of limited strikes against the isolated nation is fraught with potential escalations. The problem is the mission. A limited attack against nuclear facilities might destabilize North Korea or lead North Korea to the conclusion that the United States would intend regime change.

Regime preservation is the entire point of its nuclear capability. Therefore, it is quite conceivable that Kim Jong-Il and his advisors -- or other factions --might construe even the most limited military strikes against targets directly related to missile development or a nuclear program as an act threatening the regime, and therefore one that necessitates a fierce response. Regime survival could very easily entail a full, unlimited reprisal by the Korean People's Army (KPA) to any military strike whatsoever on North Korean soil.

North Korea has some 10,000 fortified artillery pieces trained on Seoul. It is essential to understand that South Korea's capital city, a major population center and the industrial heartland of South Korea, is within range of conventional artillery. The United States has been moving its forces out of range of these guns, but the South Koreans cannot move their capital.

Add to this the fact that North Korea has more than 100 No-Dong missiles that can reach deep into South Korea, as well as to Japan, and we can see that the possibility for retaliation is very real. Although the No-Dong has not always been the most reliable weapon, just the possibility of dozens of strikes against U.S. forces in Korea and other cities in Korea and Japan presents a daunting scenario.

North Korea has cultivated a reputation for unpredictability. Although it has been fairly conservative in its actions compared to its rhetoric, the fact is that no one can predict North Korea's response to strikes against its nuclear facilities. And with Seoul at risk -- a city of 20 million people -- the ability to take risks is limited.

The United States must assume, for the sake of planning, that U.S. airstrikes would be followed by massed artillery fire on Seoul. Now, massed artillery is itself not immune to countermeasures. But North Korea's artillery lies deep inside caves and fortifications all along the western section of the demilitarized zone (DMZ). An air campaign against these guns would take a long time, during which enormous damage would be done to Seoul and the South Korean economy -- perhaps on the order of several hundred thousand high-explosive rounds per hour. Even using tactical nuclear weapons against this artillery would pose serious threats to Seoul. The radiation from even low-yield weapons could force the evacuation of the city.

The option of moving north into the North Korean defensive belt is an option, but an enormously costly one. North Korea has a huge army and, on the defensive, it can be formidable. Fifty years of concerted military fortification would make Hezbollah's preparations in southern Lebanon look like child's play. Moving U.S. and South Korean armor into this defensive belt could break it, but only with substantial casualties and without the certainty of success. A massive stalemate along the DMZ, if it developed, would work in favor of the larger, defensive force.

Moreover, the North Koreans would have the option of moving south. Now, in U.S. thinking, this is the ideal scenario. The North Korean force on the move, outside of its fortifications, would be vulnerable to U.S. and South Korean airstrikes and superior ground maneuver and fire capabilities. In most war games, the defeat of North Korea requires the KPA to move south, exposing itself to counterstrikes.

However, the same war-gaming has also supposed at least 30 days for the activation and mobilization of U.S. forces for a counterattack. U.S. and South Korean forces would maintain an elastic defense against the North; as in the first war, forces would be rushed into the region, stabilizing the front, and then a counterattack would develop, breaking the North Korean army and allowing a move north.

There are three problems with this strategy. The first is that the elastic strategy would inevitably lead to the fall of Seoul and, if the 1950 model were a guide, a much deeper withdrawal along the Korean Peninsula. Second, the ability of the U.S. Army to deploy substantial forces to Korea within a 30-day window is highly dubious. Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom both required much longer periods of time.

Finally, the U.S. Army is already fighting two major ground wars and is stretched to the breaking point. The rotation schedule is now so tight that units are already spending more time in Iraq than they are home between rotations. The idea that the U.S. Army has a multidivisional force available for deployment in South Korea would require a national mobilization not seen since the last Korean War.

It comes down to this: If the United States strikes at North Korea's nuclear capabilities, it does so placing a bet. And that bet is that North Korea will not respond. That might be true, but if it is not true, it poses a battlefield problem to which neither South Korea nor the United States will be able to respond. In one scenario, the North Koreans bombard Seoul and the United States makes a doomed attempt at shutting down the massive artillery barrage. By the time the guns are silenced -- even in the best-case scenarios -- Seoul will be a mess. In another scenario, the North Korean army executes an offensive of even minimal competence, which costs South Korea its capital and industrial heartland. The third is a guerrilla onslaught from the elite of the North Korean Army, deployed by mini-subs and tunnels under the DMZ. The guerrillas pour into the south and wreak havoc on U.S. military installations.

That is how a U.S. strike -- and its outcome -- might look. Now, what about the Chinese and Russians? They are, of course, not likely to support such a U.S. attack (and could even supply North Korea in an extended war). Add in the fact that South Korea would not be willing to risk destroying Seoul and you arrive at a situation where even a U.S. nuclear strike against nuclear and non-nuclear targets would pose an unacceptable threat to South Korea.

There are two advantages the United States has. The first is time. There is a huge difference between a nuclear device and a deployable nuclear weapon. The latter has to be shaped into a small, rugged package able to be launched on a missile or dropped from a plane. Causing atomic fission is not the same as having a weapon.

The second advantage is distance. The United States is safe and far away from North Korea. Four other powers -- Russia, China, South Korea and Japan -- have much more to fear from North Korea than the United States does. The United States will always act unilaterally if it feels that it has no other way to protect its national interest. As it is, however, U.S. national interest is not at stake.

South Korea faces nothing less than national destruction in an all-out war. South Korea knows this and it will vigorously oppose any overt military action. Nor does China profit from a destabilized North Korea and a heavy-handed U.S. military move in its backyard. Nevertheless, if North Korea is a threat, it is first a threat to its immediate neighbors, one or more of whom can deal with North Korea.

In the end, North Korea wants regime survival. In the end, allowing the North Koran regime to survive is something that has been acceptable for over half a century. When you play out the options, the acquisition of a nuclear device -- especially one neither robust nor deployable -- does not, by itself, compel the United States to act, nor does it give the United States a militarily satisfactory option. The most important issue is the transfer of North Korean nuclear technology to other countries and groups. That is something the six-party talk participants have an equal interest in and might have the leverage to prevent.

Every situation does not have a satisfactory military solution. This seems to be one of them.

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